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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 On this appeal from an order denying a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus we consider the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel in an unusual set of circumstances.  In September 2012, 
a state-court jury convicted appellant, James Dellavecchia, of 
first-degree murder, criminal attempt (homicide), three counts of 
recklessly endangering another person, and weapons-related 
offenses.  At the trial, Lieutenant Scott Willoughby of the 
Ridley Township, Pennsylvania, Police Department, the lead 
officer investigating the crimes, gave testimony that is at the 
center of this opinion.  In particular, Willoughby testified that 
Dellavecchia made an incriminating statement immediately 
following a bedside arraignment conducted while he was 
hospitalized for a self-inflicted head injury on the day following 
his arrest for the commission of the offenses.  
  
 It is undisputed that when Dellavecchia made his 
statement without counsel present and without having been 
given Miranda1 warnings, he had not waived the right to 
counsel.  Thus, as the case law we discuss below demonstrates, 
the dispute concerns whether Willoughby deliberately elicited 
Dellavecchia’s statement or was a mere “listening post” when 
Dellavecchia, spontaneously and without prompting, 
volunteered incriminating information.   
 
 We conclude that Willoughby did not deliberately elicit 
Dellavecchia’s statement and consequently did not violate 
Dellavecchia’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  We also 
                                                 
1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966). 
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conclude that the evidence at the trial, even disregarding 
Dellavecchia’s statement, overwhelmingly supported his 
convictions and thus, even if his Sixth Amendment rights had 
been violated when he gave the statement, the ensuing error 
when Willoughby recounted the statement at trial was harmless. 
 Therefore, we will affirm the District Court order denying 
Dellavecchia’s petition for habeas corpus. 
 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
 Because the District Court did not hold an evidentiary 
hearing, we draw our statement of facts from the evidence at the 
trial and a state-court pretrial hearing on a motion that 
Dellavecchia filed seeking to suppress his statement.2  
Dellavecchia committed the crimes on October 10, 2011.  The 
events of that day started at approximately 6:00 a.m., when Scott 
Robins exited his house on Sylvania Avenue in Folsom in 
Ridley Township, Pennsylvania, to leave for work.  His 
colleague, Rick Wallace, was waiting for him in the front 
passenger seat of their work van, which was parked in Robins’s 
driveway.  According to Wallace, who testified at the trial, 
Robins opened the driver’s side door and then placed his 
belongings in the center console of the van and started to step 
into the vehicle.  Then Wallace heard gun shots and looked in 
the direction of Robins who told him to run.  Instead, Wallace 
exited the van and hid underneath it.  From that position when 
                                                 
2 The parties submitted separate appendices.  We will cite 
Dellavecchia’s appendix as “Pet. App.” and will cite the 
Attorney General of Pennsylvania’s appendix as “Pa. App.” 
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he looked in the direction of the driver’s side of the vehicle, he 
saw the legs and feet of an individual wearing white sneakers 
and jeans walking toward the street.  Wallace testified that when 
that individual turned left toward the back bumper of the van, he 
rolled out from under the vehicle and started to run across the 
street.  At that time, Wallace heard additional gunshots.   
 
 Robins’s stepdaughter, Kristen Snow, was in a 
downstairs bedroom in the Robins’s family house when Robins 
left for work.  When she heard gunshots, she ran upstairs and 
went out the front door to look for Robins.  Dellavecchia then 
shot Snow in the stomach and she fell to the ground.  Snow 
testified that after she was shot, “somebody—Mr. Dellavecchia 
came from behind the van,” walked up to her, and “held the gun 
to [her] head.”  (Pa. App. at 98a, 136:13-15).  She stated that she 
“stared at his face, [he] stared back [at me, and then] he just 
turned around and walked away.”  (Pa. App. at 98a, 136:15-18). 
  
 Francis Freeman, a neighbor and long-time acquaintance 
of Scott Robins, awakened when he heard gunshots that 
morning.  He heard a second round of gunshots and then “heard 
a woman say, help, call the police.”  (Pa. App. at 120a, 158:17-
18).  Freeman called 911, reported the gunshots, and then ran 
over to Robins and Snow.  He was with Robins when the police 
arrived, and his wife, who came to the scene of the shootings 
shortly after he did, was with Snow when they arrived.     
 
 The first police officer to reach the scene of the shootings 
was Corporal Michael Bongiorno of the Ridley Township Police 
Department.  Bongiorno knew Robins and Dellavecchia because 
the latter had made complaints to the Ridley Township Police 
Department regarding Robins.  When he arrived, Bongiorno saw 
Snow sitting in “a crunched position” on the front lawn 
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“writhing in pain.”  (Pa. App. at 140a, 178:15-18).  When 
informed that there was another victim, Bongiorno went around 
the van and found Robins partially underneath the front of the 
vehicle.  Bongiorno testified at the trial that he then had the 
following conversation with Robins:  “I said to him, you know, 
what the hell happened? What happened? Who shot you? And 
he said, Dellavecchia.  And I said, your neighbor?  And he said, 
yeah.  And he went like that with his left hand and kind of 
pointed towards Ninth Avenue.”  (Pa. App. at 142a, 180:6-11).  
Snow and Freeman testified at the trial that they also heard 
Robins identify Dellavecchia as the shooter to Bongiorno.   
 
 After the above exchange, other officers arrived, and 
Bongiorno, along with Officer Robert Ruskowski, also of the 
Ridley Township Police Department, left the scene of the 
shootings and moved toward Ninth Avenue in the direction to 
which Robins had pointed.  While going toward Ninth Avenue, 
Bongiorno contacted the police dispatcher via his radio 
communication system and provided the name “Dellavecchia” 
to the dispatcher whom he asked to get Dellavecchia’s address 
and telephone number.  The dispatcher did so and gave 
Bongiorno this information minutes later.  At approximately the 
same time, a neighbor called out to Bongiorno from across the 
street, “Dellavecchia’s house is that one,” and pointed to a 
particular house.  (Pa. App. at 145a, 183:9-17).  While still 
outside the Dellavecchia house, Bongiorno called the dispatcher 
with a direction to call the Dellavecchia telephone number and 
ask whoever answered to step outside.  “Some seconds later,” 
the dispatcher informed Bongiorno that Mrs. Dellavecchia was 
on the phone, and she then came to the front door where 
Bongiorno was standing.  (Pa. App. at 146a, 184:11 to 147a, 
185:2).  In response to Bongiorno’s questioning about who else 
was in the house, Mrs. Dellavecchia stated that her husband was 
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in the shower.  Bongiorno then escorted Mrs. Dellavecchia 
down the driveway and handed her off to another officer with a 
direction to prevent her from returning to the house.   
  
 Bongiorno, along with Ruskowski, then entered the house 
and walked up the stairs in the direction of the shower.  After 
they found Dellavecchia in an upstairs bedroom getting dressed, 
they instructed him to freeze.  Bongiorno handcuffed 
Dellavecchia and informed him that he was being detained for 
an investigation involving a shooting.  The officers then 
removed Dellavecchia from the house, and Ruskowski 
transported him to the police station.  Bongiorno testified that as 
he stood with Dellavecchia in the upstairs bedroom, he noticed a 
spot of blood on the bureau and saw a pair of white sneakers that 
appeared to be wet.  Ruskowski, while securing the house, 
discovered a partially obscured briefcase underneath the bed 
near where Dellavecchia was dressing.  Ruskowski informed 
Bongiorno of the discovery and pointed out that there was an 
additional spot of blood on top of the briefcase.  At that time, 
Bongiorno cautioned Ruskowski and another officer who was 
securing the house not to touch the briefcase and to make sure 
that no one else was inside the house.  While Ruskowski was 
taking Dellavecchia to the police station and Robins and Snow 
were being transported to a hospital, Bongiorno turned the crime 
scene over to detectives and supervisors from the next shift who  
had begun to arrive at the scene.   
 
 Willoughby was one of the officers who arrived at the 
crime scene at that time.  According to Willoughby, he had the 
responsibility to direct the other officers in the collection of 
evidence, containment of the crime scene, and coordination with 
witnesses, among other tasks.  Under his supervision, Ridley 
Township police officers collected evidence from the scene of 
 
 8 
the shootings including 13 .40 caliber federal ammunition shell 
casings and four bullet fragments. 
  
 Shortly after his arrival on the scene, Willoughby 
directed a sergeant who was back at the police station to seek a 
search warrant for the Dellavecchia home.  The sergeant 
obtained the warrant and delivered it to Willoughby.  Then, with 
the assistance of other members of the Ridley Township Police 
Department, Willoughby entered the Dellavecchia home to 
execute the warrant.  During the ensuing search the police seized 
the pair of white sneakers that Bongiorno earlier had noticed.  
Willoughby explained that as he circled the residence, he 
noticed a hose in the back of the house where there was a fresh 
puddle of water with muddy footprints.  He surmised that 
someone recently had cleaned off his shoes at that location.  
Inasmuch as the white sneakers in the bedroom were wet, 
Willoughby collected them as evidence.   
   
 The officers next seized the briefcase that Ruskowski had 
discovered underneath the bed.  When Willoughby removed the 
briefcase from that location, he noted “drippings of blood” on 
the visible top portion.  (Pa. App. at 197a, 20:1).  The contents 
of the briefcase included a black plastic box in a plastic bag 
containing a Ruger .40 caliber semi-automatic handgun and two 
boxes of .40 caliber federal ammunition which, like the 
handgun, were inside a black plastic bag.  The .40 caliber 
federal ammunition matched the shell casings found at the scene 
of the shootings.  One box was full and contained all 50 live 
rounds but the other box was missing 17 rounds. 
      
 During the search, Willoughby seized a pair of jeans and 
a white sweater from Dellavecchia’s basement from a spot 
immediately inside the back door near the place where the hose 
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and fresh puddle were found.  Willoughby observed what he 
thought was a blood stain on the white sweater.  It appeared to 
him that someone hurriedly had removed the clothing so he 
seized both articles as evidence.   
      
 After the officers collected evidence, Willoughby 
returned to the Ridley Township police station to speak with 
Dellavecchia.  As he prepared to do so, he “heard a loud bang up 
in the cell.”  (Pa. App. at 204a, 27:6-8).  When Willoughby went 
to the cell to investigate the noise, he discovered that 
Dellavecchia had run head first into the jail cell bars and 
required immediate medical attention.  The police then took him 
to the Chester-Crozer Hospital where he was admitted.  
  
 The following day, Willoughby learned that Dellavecchia 
was coherent, though still hospitalized.  Willoughby then 
brought Vincent Gallagher, Magisterial District Judge for Ridley 
Township, to the hospital to conduct a bedside arraignment for 
Dellavecchia.  At the arraignment, Dellavecchia was advised 
that he had been charged with various crimes including the 
murder of Scott Robins who had died and also was advised of 
his defendant’s rights.  Thereafter, as described below, he made 
the statement to Willoughby that is the basis for this appeal.   
 
 After he was indicted, Dellavecchia made a motion to 
suppress his bedside statement and the state common pleas court 
held a hearing on the motion on July 18, 2012.  At the hearing 
Willoughby gave, inter alia, the following testimony: 
 
[A]s soon as District Justice Gallagher arraigned 
the Defendant he turned and started to walk out of 
the room.  Mr. Dellavecchia asked me who are 
you.  I introduced myself as Lieutenant Scott 
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Willoughby from the Ridley Township Police 
Department.  I told him I was in charge of the 
investigation, at which time he asked me to sit.  I 
sat.  He put out his hand.  I shook his hand.  And 
he stated this.  I really fucked up.  He asked me to 
sit down.  And he says Scotty, I want to tell you 
what happened.  I sat in the chair and Mr. 
Dellavecchia began to talk freely and openly. 
 
(Pet. App. at 65a, 48:8-19).  Willoughby testified that he did not 
go to the hospital intending to interview Dellavecchia and 
consequently did not bring a notepad or a Miranda waiver form 
with him when he went there.  Willoughby explained that until 
the arraignment, the Ridley Township Police Department was 
responsible for supervising Dellavecchia’s custody, but that 
after the arraignment that responsibility shifted to prison 
personnel.  Accordingly, Willoughby intended to have 
Dellavecchia arraigned as soon as possible to facilitate this 
administrative transition.  Willoughby testified that after 
Dellavecchia blurted out the above statement, he asked 
Willoughby “if I say anything can it be used against me[?]”  
(Pet. App. at 70a, 53:11-13).  Willoughby responded that 
anything he said could be used against him.  
  
 The first substantive topic that Dellavecchia addressed 
after his initial statement to Willoughby was his relationship 
with Scott Robins.  Dellavecchia said that they had known each 
other since Robins was a child because Robins had grown up in 
the house in which he was living at the time he was shot.  
Dellavecchia stated that he never was fond of Robins.  
Dellavecchia told Willoughby that for several months, Robins 
had been building a shed too close to the property line without 
the required permits.  Dellavecchia also complained that, while 
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Robins was building the shed, he played loud music and used an 
air staple gun near the property line.  On several occasions in the 
months leading up to the shooting, Dellavecchia had contacted 
the Ridley Township Police Department to complain about the 
construction of the shed.  He explained that on one occasion, 
Robins threatened him, and he was intimidated by Robins’s size, 
which prompted him to buy the gun.   
 
 Willoughby testified that Dellavecchia continued his 
uninterrupted narrative and provided the following account of 
the events of the previous morning.  He was “awoken by the 
sound of somebody tapping on a tin shed” in his yard.  (Pet. 
App. at 73a, 56:16-17).    He got up, got dressed, got out his 
gun, went downstairs, and loaded the gun.  “His plan was to go 
out back and investigate the noise.”  (Pet. App. at 73a, 56:20-
21).  He searched his yard, but “wasn’t able to find anyone near 
the shed.”  (Pet. App. at 73a, 56:24-25).  He did, however, 
“notice that the light was on over at Scott’s house,” so he 
“figured that Scott was fucking with him.”  (Pet. App. at 74a, 
57:1-3).  He left his yard and walked away from Sylvania 
Avenue toward Swarthmore Avenue, in the opposite direction 
from Robins’s house.  He then made the first left on 
Swarthmore, the first left on Tenth Avenue, and the first left on 
Sylvania Avenue—the street on which Scott Robins lived—on 
his route to return home.     
   
 As Dellavecchia approached Robins’s house, “Scott’s 
van was running and Scott was standing outside the van door.”  
(Pet. App. at 74a, 57:23-24).  Dellavecchia “thought of turning 
around,” but he didn’t.  (Pet. App. at 74a, 57:24-25).  “He just 
kept walking until he saw that Scott had given him a stare.”  
(Pet. App. at 74a, 57:25 to 75a, 58:2).  Then, “Dellavecchia felt 
really threatened by the way that Scott was looking at him,” so 
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he “pointed his gun and he fired.”  (Pet. App. at 75a, 58:4-7).  
Dellavecchia fired the gun “until Scott was gone,” at which time 
“he saw a figure in a white shirt running at him” so he turned 
and “aimlessly started firing at the figure.”  (Pet. App. at 75a, 
58:10-14).   He then noticed that “the gun wouldn’t fire any 
more” and “the slide had been locked back, which meant the 
gun was empty.”  (Pet. App. at 75a, 58:14-17).  Dellavecchia 
then ran home, and while doing so defecated on himself.  He 
entered his house through the basement, removed his clothing, 
and went upstairs to shower.  “[T]he next thing he knew  the 
police were coming up the steps and they put him in handcuffs.” 
 (Pet. App. at 76a, 59:9-10).   
 
 After recounting Dellavecchia’s statement at the 
suppression hearing, Willoughby reiterated that during 
Dellavecchia’s entire narrative, he did not pose any questions to 
Dellavecchia.  Rather, he “just sat and listened” and took notes 
on several Crozer Hospital forms that he took from a nearby 
table.  (Pet. App. at 76a, 59:24 to 77a, 60:14).  Willoughby 
stated that following this narrative, he asked a series of 
questions that Dellavecchia answered.  Willoughby indicated 
that he did not give Dellavecchia  Miranda warnings.  Moreover, 
even though, as Willoughby was aware, Dellavecchia’s son had 
obtained an attorney for him, Willoughby did not inform 
Dellavecchia that his son had done so.  At the trial, Willoughby 
provided an account of Dellavecchia’s statement similar to the 
one he gave at the suppression hearing, although in slightly less 
detail.     
 
 Dellavecchia testified at the trial.  He first explained his 
fear of Robins, as well as their feud related to Robins’s shed.  
He then provided a narrative of the events of the day of the 
shooting, which was, in many respects, consistent with 
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Willoughby’s account of Dellavecchia’s October 2011 
statement.  This narrative differed, however, with respect to the 
point at which Dellavecchia was walking past Robins’s house 
when returning home.  Specifically, at trial Dellavecchia 
testified as follows: 
 
[Robins] had this expression on his face.  He had 
his left hand on the steering wheel, his right hand 
on the door and he was leaning forward.  So I 
looked away and within a moment’s notice I felt 
his presence on me and he had me by my right -- 
right side of my clothing.  I went to duck and he 
hit me right here on the side of my left temple and 
my ear, knocking my glasses down.  As I bent 
down, he uppercut at me.  This guy, amazing.  I 
started seeing stars and I hear my ears ringing.  I 
got my gun in my -- belt, my hands -- my glasses 
in my hand and he’s throwing me around. 
   
(Pa. App. at 320a, 94:3-14).  He continued: 
 
I tried to pull away from [Robins] and he was 
pulling up on my shirt and what not and my -- I 
felt my gun come up and I had -- had my gun in 
my hand and we were banging against the -- the 
van’s side and I was trying . . . to pull away from 
him, but unfortunately he swung me around the 
door and now we’re in the front of the van. 
 
(Pa. App. at 325a, 99:21 to 326a, 100:10).  When asked what 
happened next, Dellavecchia responded, “I heard gunshots, so 
obvious[ly] I was firing the gun.”  (Pa. App. at 326a, 100:25 to 
327a, 101:1).  Dellavecchia testified that he does not remember 
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pulling the trigger or aiming the weapon at Robins but stated 
that they: “were flailing around.  I was flailing around.  I was 
just trying to get away from him.”  (Pa. App. at 328a, 102:15- 
22).   
 
Dellavecchia continued his testimony as follows: 
 
I was let loose.  I broke away.  I ran to the van 
and I notice as I’m running down Sylvania 
Avenue that I was -- I was in pain.  My back was 
hurting and I was limping and I felt something 
wet on my spine.  I thought I had been shot.  I got 
to my basement.  I start taking my clothes off and 
I soiled myself.  I left my clothing there, went 
upstairs and I was going to clean off. 
 
(Pa. App. at 329a, 103:15-22).  He concluded this portion of his 
testimony by stating that he did not recall being arrested.     
 
 After Dellavecchia gave the above testimony he was 
questioned about the statement he gave to Willoughby in the 
hospital.  When asked whether he understood Willoughby, 
Dellavecchia stated as follows:  “He said do you understand and 
I said, no.  And he said do you want a lawyer, I said I need a 
lawyer.  I don’t understand the meaning of what you’re saying 
to me.”  (Pa. App. at 334a, 108:7-12).  Dellavecchia also stated 
that during this meeting Willoughby asked questions, and when 
Dellavecchia said he wanted to see his wife, Willoughby 
responded that he needed a statement first.     
 
 On cross-examination, Dellavecchia stated that at the 
time of his arrest on October 10, 2011, he “had two black eyes, 
[a] bloody nose, cut lip, bit [his] tongue, [his] right shin area was 
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bleeding and [he] had bruises and contusions [on his] back and 
arms.”  (Pa. App. at 351a, 125:11-14).  He several times made 
the crucial statement that he shot Scott Robins.  In fact, he stated 
that it was “obvious” that he “shot and killed Scott Robins.”  
(Pa. App. at 377a, 138:21-25). 
 
 To counter Dellavecchia’s testimony implying that he 
shot Robins in self-defense and had sustained injuries in their 
struggle, the Commonwealth called a law enforcement officer to 
introduce photographs of Dellavecchia taken on October 12, 
2011, two days after the shootings.  These photographs did not 
show that Dellavecchia had been injured.  The Commonwealth 
also introduced testimony from Ruskowski, who had taken 
Dellavecchia to the Ridley Township police station from his 
house when he was arrested.  Ruskowski testified that during 
that transport, Dellavecchia did not have black eyes, a bloody 
nose, a split lip, or any other visible injuries to his face.   
 
 The Commonwealth also introduced evidence from the 
medical examiner in the case, Dr. Frederic Hellman, who 
testified about, among other things, the cause of death, manner 
of death, and the removal and transfer of ballistics related to 
Robins.  Hellman said that the cause of death was multiple 
gunshot wounds and the manner of death was homicide.  He 
testified that he recovered three bullets from Robins’s body, 
including one that entered the right lower back, one that entered 
the left buttock, and one that entered the beginning of the right 
thigh bone.  Hellman also recovered several bullet fragments in 
Robins’s left and right forearms.     
 
 Hellman testified that he did not find in any of these 
gunshot wounds evidence of “soot, which is the residual of the 
primer at the base of the bullet,” or evidence of “gunpowder 
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stippling, which would be small scrapes or abrasions” on 
Robins’s skin that would have resulted from “gunpowder 
particles impacting adjacent to an entrance wound.”  (Pa. App. 
at 275a, 29:15-24).  Hellman explained that generally he finds 
soot when the distance between the muzzle of the gun and the 
target area at the time of the shooting measures approximately 
eight to ten inches and that he generally finds stippling when the 
distance between the muzzle of the gun and the target area 
measures two-and-a-half to three feet.  Based on this evidence, 
Hellman indicated that in his opinion the gunshot wounds were 
not inflicted by a weapon fired within two-and-a-half to three 
feet of Robins.   
 
B. Procedural History 
 
 As we have indicated, prior to the trial Dellavecchia filed 
a motion to suppress his October 11 statement to Willoughby.  
On September 25, 2012, the common pleas court denied the 
suppression motion with respect to Dellavecchia’s spontaneous 
and unsolicited statement but suppressed his responses to 
Willoughby’s subsequent questions.    These rulings were oral, 
but after Dellavecchia appealed, the common pleas court filed a  
written opinion explaining the reasons for its decision.3     
 
 On September 28, 2012, a jury convicted Dellavecchia of 
the offenses that we set forth above.  The common pleas court 
sentenced Dellavecchia to a mandatory term of life in prison 
without parole for the murder of Scott Robins and to custodial 
                                                 
3 The written opinion also rejected Dellavecchia’s claim 
contending that the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct relating 
to credibility issues but we are not concerned with that issue on 
this appeal. 
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sentences consecutive to the life sentence for the other offenses. 
  
 On December 12, 2012, Dellavecchia filed a timely 
appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, and on November 
20, 2013, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court affirmed his 
conviction.  See Commonwealth v. Dellavecchia, 91 A.3d 1291 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2013); Commonwealth v. Dellavecchia, No. 
3418 EDA 2012, 2013 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2776 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 23, 2013).  That court held that although the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached by the time 
Dellavecchia gave his statement because the Commonwealth 
already had initiated an adversarial proceeding against him, 
Dellavecchia’s Sixth Amendment rights had not been infringed 
as Willoughby did not elicit the statement.  Dellavecchia filed an 
application for reargument en banc, which the Superior Court 
denied on January 28, 2014.  Dellavecchia then filed a petition 
for allowance of an appeal by the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania but that court denied the petition on July 8, 2014.  
Commonwealth v. Dellavecchia, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014).   
 
 Following the exhaustion of his state-court remedies, 
Dellavecchia filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254 asserting that his 
Sixth Amendment rights were violated when he gave his 
statement.4  The Court referred the case to a magistrate judge 
who on January 28, 2015, issued a report with a 
recommendation that the Court deny the petition.  On March 2, 
2015, the Court approved and adopted the magistrate judge’s 
report and recommendation and denied the petition.  
Dellavecchia then appealed to this Court and sought a certificate 
                                                 
4 Dellavecchia does not contend that his Fifth Amendment rights 
were violated. 
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of appealability which we granted.   
 
   
III.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and we have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because the District Court did not conduct 
an evidentiary hearing, our review of its denial of 
Dellavecchia’s petition for habeas corpus is plenary.  See 
Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 113 (3d Cir. 2009).  However, 
the state court’s factual findings are entitled to a presumption of 
correctness, and Dellavecchia bears the burden to rebut that 
presumption by clear and convincing evidence.  28 U.S.C. § 
2254(e)(1); see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459, 
106 S.Ct. 2616, 2630 (1986).    
 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
 
A. Habeas Corpus 
 
 A district court has authority to issue a writ of habeas 
corpus on a petition filed by a prisoner in state custody solely on 
the ground that he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution 
or laws or treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).  
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), sets forth as follows: 
 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on 
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court shall not be granted 
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with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on 
the merits in State court proceedings unless the 
adjudication of the claim – 
 
(1)  resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States; or 
 
(2)  resulted in a decision that was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 
the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).   
 
 We have explained that this provision “mandates a two-
part inquiry.”  Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 
877, 880 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc).  “[F]irst, the federal court 
must inquire whether the state court decision was ‘contrary to’ 
clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States.”5  Id. “[S]econd, if it was not, the 
federal court must evaluate whether the state court judgment 
rests upon an objectively unreasonable application of clearly 
established Supreme Court jurisprudence.”  Id.  Furthermore, we 
recognize that, in conducting this inquiry, “[f]actual issues 
                                                 
5 Although Dellavecchia has argued that the state courts 
unreasonably applied federal law, he has not argued that the 
state courts’ decisions were contrary to clearly established 
federal law, nor has he rebutted the Commonwealth’s contention 
that such decisions were not contrary to such law.  Therefore, 
our analysis does not address that part of the AEDPA test. 
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determined by a state court are presumed to be correct and the 
petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by 
clear and convincing evidence.”  Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 
178, 196 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). 
 
 It is a well-established principle that “habeas corpus is 
not to be used as a second criminal trial, and federal courts are 
not to run roughshod over the considered findings and 
judgments of the state courts that conducted the original trial 
and heard the initial appeals.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
362, 383, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1508 (2000).  Rather, the Supreme 
Court has “long insisted that federal habeas courts attend closely 
to those considered decisions, and give them full effect when 
their findings and judgments are consistent with federal law.”  
Id.  The respect given to state-court decisions by the federal 
courts on habeas proceedings is demonstrated by “the fact that 
[even if] constitutional error occurred in the proceedings that led 
to a state-court conviction [that circumstance] may not alone be 
sufficient reason for concluding that a prisoner is entitled to the 
remedy of habeas.”  Id. at 375, 120 S.Ct. at 1503 (citations 
omitted).   
 
B. Constitutionality of the Admission of the 
Statement Pursuant to Established  
Sixth Amendment Precedent 
 
 The Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides in relevant part 
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”  
U.S. Const. amend VI.  Dellavecchia relies on the progeny of 
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199 (1964), to 
contend that the trial court’s admission of his hospital statement 
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to Willoughby was an “unreasonable application of” Supreme 
Court precedent.   
 
 The Sixth Amendment “serves to safeguard the 
adversarial process by ensuring that once the right to counsel 
has attached the accused ‘need not stand alone against the State’ 
at any ‘critical stage’ of the aggregate proceedings against 
him.”6  Bey v. Morton, 124 F.3d 524, 528 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 470, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 
1876-77 (1981)).  The Supreme Court long has held that “an 
individual who stands indicted of a crime is denied his right to 
counsel when agents of the state circumvent that right by 
‘deliberately eliciting’ inculpatory statements from him in the 
absence of his counsel, absent a voluntary and knowing waiver.” 
 Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 
344, 348-49, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 1179 (1990)).  The “deliberate 
elicitation” doctrine is derived from Massiah, a case in which 
the Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment protections 
extend to “indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as 
those conducted in the jailhouse.”  Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206, 84 
S.Ct. at 1203.   
 
 The Supreme Court applied this doctrine in the well-
known case of Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232 
(1977), which involved a Christmas Eve murder of a ten-year-
old girl in Des Moines, Iowa.  Id. at 390, 97 S.Ct. at 1235.  Two 
days after the girl disappeared while her whereabouts still were 
unknown, an individual who became the defendant in the case, 
Robert Williams, on advice of a Des Moines attorney, Henry 
                                                 
6 The Commonwealth does not dispute that Dellavecchia’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel had attached at the time that he 
made his post-arraignment hospital statement.   
 
 22 
McKnight, turned himself in to the police in Davenport, Iowa, 
160 miles from Des Moines.  Id.  In Davenport, a second 
attorney represented Williams at his arraignment and advised 
Williams not to make any statements until he consulted with 
McKnight.  Id. at 391, 97 S.Ct. at 1236.  Moreover, the police 
advised Williams of his Miranda rights while he was in 
Davenport.   
 
 After Williams surrendered, two officers from the Des 
Moines police department traveled to Davenport to take custody 
of him to transport him to Des Moines.  Id.  Before the trip, 
McKnight, who was waiting in Des Moines, advised Williams 
on the telephone not to speak to the officers while they were 
taking him to Des Moines.  Id. at 391, 97 S.Ct. at 1235.  
Moreover, McKnight told the officers not to interrogate him.  Id. 
at 391, 97 S.Ct. at 1236.  The Supreme Court indicated that “[a]t 
no time during the trip did Williams express a willingness to be 
interrogated in the absence of an attorney.  Instead, he stated 
several times that ‘[w]hen I get to Des Moines and see [my 
attorney], I am going to tell you the whole story.’”  Id. at 392, 
97 S.Ct. at 1236.   
 
 During the transport, a Des Moines detective delivered 
what has since been called the “Christian burial speech.”  Id.  
The detective, who knew that Williams was an escaped mental 
patient and a deeply religious man, id. at 403, 97 S.Ct. at 1241, 
asked Williams to think about the fact that the weather 
conditions were poor and a delay in identifying the location of 
the girl’s body could prevent her eventual discovery, thus 
denying her parents the ability to give her a “Christian burial.”  
Id. at 392-93, 97 S.Ct. at 1236-37.  Following this speech, 
Williams informed the officers that he would show them the 
location of the body, and ultimately he did so.  Id. at 393, 97 
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S.Ct. at 1237.   
 
 The critical point in the Supreme Court’s opinion holding 
that there was a Sixth Amendment violation was that a detective 
transporting him to Des Moines “deliberately and designedly set 
out to elicit information from Williams just as surely as—and 
perhaps more effectively than—if he had formally interrogated 
him.”  Id. at 399, 97 S.Ct. at 1240.  The Court expressly noted 
that “he purposely sought during Williams’ isolation from his 
lawyers to obtain as much incriminating information as 
possible.”  Id.  In the Court’s view, this approach amounted to 
an interrogation so that its occurrence in the absence of counsel 
constituted a violation of Williams’s Sixth Amendment rights.  
Id. at 401, 97 S.Ct. 1240-41.   
 
 The Supreme Court’s development of Sixth Amendment 
law continued in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 
S.Ct. 2183 (1980).  In Henry, the government obtained the 
assistance of a confidential informant inmate housed in the same 
cellblock with Henry who was then awaiting trial for bank 
robbery.  Id. at 266, 100 S.Ct. at 2184.  The FBI agent in charge 
of the investigation instructed the confidential informant “to be 
alert to any statements” but “not to initiate any conversation 
with or question Henry regarding the bank robbery.”  Id. at 266, 
100 S.Ct. at 2184-85.  Ultimately, the informant testified at trial 
that he had “an opportunity to have some conversations with Mr. 
Henry while he was in jail” and Henry had “described to him the 
details of the robbery[.]”   Id. at 267, 100 S.Ct. at 2185 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 
 The Supreme Court concluded that the above interaction 
was impermissible.  Id. at 274, 100 S.Ct. at 2189.  The Court 
highlighted the fact that, according to the testimony of the 
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informant, he was “not a passive listener; rather, he had some 
conversations with Mr. Henry while he was in jail and Henry’s 
incriminatory statements were the product of this conversation.” 
 Id. at 271, 100 S.Ct. at 2187 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 The Court likewise emphasized that Henry was unaware of the 
inmate’s role as a government informant.  Id. at 272, 100 S.Ct. 
at 2188.  In light of these factors, the Court held that “[b]y 
intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make 
incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the 
Government violated Henry’s Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.”  Id. at 274, 100 S.Ct. at 2189.   
 
 In contrast to what happened in Henry, the Supreme 
Court found that the facts in Kuhlmann did not constitute a Sixth 
Amendment violation.  Kuhlmann, like Henry, involved a 
jailhouse informant, but in Kuhlmann the trial court expressly 
noted that the defendant’s statements to the informant were 
“unsolicited” and “spontaneous.”  Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 440, 
106 S.Ct. at 2620 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Specifically, the trial court found that the informant “at no time 
asked any questions with respect to the crime” and that he “only 
listened to [the defendant] and made notes regarding what [the 
defendant] had to say.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The Supreme Court made clear that “the Sixth Amendment is 
not violated whenever—by luck or happenstance—the State 
obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right 
to counsel has attached[.]”  Id. at 459, 106 S.Ct. at 2630 
(quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, 
487 (1985)).  Rather, to show a violation, “the defendant must 
demonstrate that the police and their informant took some 
action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately 
to elicit incriminating remarks.”  Id.   
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 Applying the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment 
precedent to the facts here, we conclude that Willoughby by his 
conduct did not deliberately elicit a statement from 
Dellavecchia.7  As was true of the informant in Kuhlmann, 
Willoughby did nothing more than listen to a defendant’s 
spontaneous and unsolicited statement that was both 
unprompted and willingly provided.  In contrast to what 
happened in Brewer where the Court found “no serious doubt” 
that the police officer “deliberately and designedly set out to 
elicit information,” here the state courts concluded that 
Willoughby did not go to the hospital with the intent to question 
Dellavecchia.  Brewer, 430 U.S. at 499, 97 S.Ct. at 1240.  We 
have no basis on which to reject that finding.  Moreover, 
Dellavecchia asked whether—and was advised by Willoughby 
that—anything he said could be used against him.  Thus, 
Willoughby rather than eliciting a statement from Dellavecchia 
in effect encouraged him to remain silent.  After all, a police 
                                                 
7 Although our analysis turns, as it must, on “clearly established 
federal law[] as determined by the Supreme Court,” 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(1), our conclusion also comports with our own 
precedent.  In Bey v. Morton, we analyzed the Supreme Court’s 
Sixth Amendment line of cases to determine if “there are any 
circumstances under which the state can deliberately undertake 
to secure incriminating information from a represented 
defendant in the absence of counsel and can thereafter use in 
court the incriminating information it obtains.”  124 F.3d at 530. 
 We concluded that the “answer that has evolved is that it can, 
only if there is not ‘elicitation’—only if the government does no 
more than listen.”  Id.  “It cannot if the police or their informants 
question or otherwise encourage or facilitate the defendant’s 
discussion of the crime, and this is true even if the defendant 
initiates the discussion of the criminal conduct.”  Id. 
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officer seeking to induce a defendant to make a statement would 
recognize that he would not be doing so by warning the 
defendant that if he made a statement, his statement could be 
used against him.   
 
 In light of the unassailable state-court findings on the 
motion to suppress, the Superior Court, in affirming the 
common pleas court’s decision denying the motion with respect 
to Dellavecchia’s spontaneous statement, did not come to a 
conclusion that unreasonably applied clearly established Federal 
law as determined by the Supreme Court and did not make an 
unreasonable determination of the facts.8   In short, there is 
nothing in the Massiah line of cases requiring a police officer to 
reject or ignore a defendant’s voluntary statements.  To the 
contrary, when a defendant provides an uninterrupted narrative 
about his offenses, a state has no obligation to hinder him in 
making that statement and is not required to persuade an 
otherwise willing individual to remain silent.   
 
 Even though the Supreme Court has said “that the clear 
rule of Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have 
commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal 
representation when the government interrogates him,” Brewer, 
430 U.S. at 401, 97 S.Ct. at 1240, spontaneous and unprompted 
statements voluntarily provided to the police may be used at trial 
when there has not been an interrogation of the type the Court 
described in Brewer.  Here there was no such interrogation so 
Dellavecchia’s statement could be used at the trial.   
 
                                                 
8 While we review the Superior Court decision, we would reach 
the same result if we directly were reviewing the common pleas 
court’s decision. 
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               C.  Harmless Error 
 Finally we point out that even if the state courts erred 
when they did not exclude evidence of Dellavecchia’s statement, 
we still would affirm the District Court order denying 
Dellavecchia’s petition because the evidence of Dellavecchia’s 
guilt was overwhelming.  See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 
619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1721-22 (1993); Alston v. Redman, 
34 F.3d 1237, 1252 (3d Cir. 1994).  It is well established that 
“[t]he writ of habeas corpus has limited scope” as “the federal 
courts do not sit to re-try state cases de novo, but, rather, to 
review for violation of federal constitutional standards.”  Milton 
v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 2178 (1972).  
But “[i]n that process we do not close our eyes to the reality of 
overwhelming evidence of guilt fairly established in the state 
court . . . .”  Id.  Applying this principle to the facts at hand, we 
conclude that the unchallenged evidence of Dellavecchia’s guilt 
would require that we affirm the District Court’s order denying 
his petition even if there was a Sixth Amendment violation 
because it is clear that the admission of Dellavecchia’s statement 
was harmless even if judged on the most exacting standard. 
 
 To start, there is no dispute that Dellavecchia shot and 
killed Scott Robins.  After all, Dellavecchia conceded this point 
numerous times during his testimony at trial.  Thus, 
Dellavecchia does not dispute Robins’s identification of him to 
Bongiorno as his shooter at the time the police arrived on scene. 
 Rather, Dellavecchia’s sole defense was that he shot and killed 
Robins in self-defense during a struggle.  But the physical 
evidence cannot be reconciled with Dellavecchia’s self-defense 
account of the homicide.  The medical examiner’s testimony 
showed that two of the three penetrating gunshot wounds 
entered Robins’s body through his right lower back and his left 
buttock, thus indicating that Robins was shot with his back to 
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his shooter—a point which is consistent with the testimony of 
Robins’s colleague, Richard Wallace.  Moreover, the medical 
examiner noted that the lack of soot or stippling on Robins’s 
body indicates that the shots were fired from more than three 
feet away, again contradicting Dellavecchia’s testimony that the 
shots were fired during a hand-to-hand struggle.  Finally, 
photographs entered in evidence as well as the testimony of the 
officer who transported Dellavecchia from his residence to the 
police station contradicted Dellavecchia’s testimony that he had 
two black eyes and various other facial injuries as a result of this 
struggle.  In short, we hold that even if Willoughby’s testimony 
regarding the October 11 statement was improperly admitted at 
trial, such admission was harmless in light of the overwhelming 
evidence of Dellavecchia’s guilt.9 
 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order of March 2, 2015, denying Dellavecchia’s petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Although we focus our harmless error analysis on the murder 
conviction, it applies to all of the offenses for which the jury 
convicted Dellavecchia. 
